Current linguistic theory rigidly compartmentalizes the "cognitive," linguistic aspects of human communication and the presumed nemotive, paralinguistic elements that occur in both human and nonhuman communication. The segmental phoLetic units of human speech, according to this view, are supposed to convey linguistically relevant information, e.g., the vowel distinction that differentiates the English words °bit'. and "bet. Emotive, paralinguistic qualities are supposedly transmitted only by means of prosodic modifications like fundaental frequency, amplitude, and tempo as well gestures and facial expressions. Animals, according to this view, make use only of these ',paralinguistic', parameters. This distinction is false. The same phonetic feature space is used for both paralinguistic and linguistic communication, and the semantic boundary line between these two aspects of human communication is not sharp. 
and "paralinguistic" aspects of human communication. Linguistic communication has been equated to the transmission of cognitive, referential information.
Paralinguistic communication has been taken to relate to the transmission of "emotive" states. Implicit in this distinction is the notion that human language is the medium that allows modern man to think, that,in essence, language is the basis of cognitive ability., Hence the clearly unique aspects of human language, the ability of modern man to form words, phrases, etc., are considered linguistic. In contrast, the prosodic aspects of human language, that is, the modulations of pitch, amplitude and temporal pattern, which clearly play a part in the communications of other.
living species besidei Homo sapiens, are considered paralinguistic.
This distinction between the supposedly paralinguistic and linguistic aspects of communication is misleading. While all animals do make use of innately determined cries to signal certain basic states of their autonomic vegetative systems, no clear distinction can be shown for many of the phenomena that are supposedly "paralinguistic" or "linguistic" in human, or for that matter in non-human, communication. The gasp of a drowning man is an example of an innately determined cry as.is the cry of a rabbit or dog or a man in extreme pain. Darwin (1872) in The Ebcpression of EMotion in Man and Animals, clearly differentiated these basic cries, which he noted were independent of . habit or training, from the "emotive" information that linguists often classify as "paralinguistic". Linguistsi in general, tend to classify the transmission of information as paralingUistic when they lack adequate. notational systems.
If a speaker, for example, told his friend that, The train is due at 8 a.m.
but I don't believe it, the information would be treated as a linguistic Prosodic contours and gestures can have a role even as they do in the languages of other species, living and extinct.
In connection with this last point, it is probable that an advanced hominid species like classic Neanderthal man (Lieberman, 1972) (Soleiki, 1972; Boule and Vallois, 1957; Bordes, 1968) . Present day Homo'sapiens has a great seg mental phonetic inventory and the semantic construct of disbelief can be expressed either by means of "tone of voice" or through the use of some additional words.
There clearly is no rigid dichotomy wherein certain semantic constructs are "paralinguistic ",, others being "linguistic". The rigid dichotomy is an artifice. Any semantic construct that can be paraphrased in terms of a string of words is obviously."linguistic". The use of a phonetic element that cannot be transcribed using the IPA symbol inventory does not make the semantic con struct "paralinguistic ". There is no clear line of demarcation-at. the semantic level.
No rigid dichotomy exists at the phonetic level with respect to "paralinguistic" and "linguistic" phonetic units. A phonetic clement is really a signalling unit (Lieberman, 1970) . Linguists have been accustomed to manipulate the segmental phonetic elements that are, for the most part, the consequence of the articulatory maneuvers of the supralaryngeal vocal tract in Homo sapiens.
Sound contrasts like the vowels [a) and [i), for example, are the result of articulatory maneuvers involving only the supralaryngeal vocal tract (Fent, 1960 ).
Many of the phonetic distinctions that differentiate the segmental phonetic elements are, however, the consequence 'of laryngeal maneuvers, for example, the distinction between the sounds [b) and [p) (Lisker and Abramson, 1964) .
The distinction between these two sounds rests in the timing between the start of phonation and the release of the primarj occlusion of the supralaryngeal vocal tract. Many languages make use of differences in the dynamic pattern of the fundamental frequency of phonation to signal lexical differences.
The various dialects of Chinese, for example, make use of.variations in fundamental frequency(which are perceived as pitch variations), to differentiate various words. A speaker of American-English does not make use of these distinctions to differentiate the lexical entries of his linguistic "dictionary, of words". The speaker of American English is thus free to use these pitch variations, i.e., "tone" features, to simultaneously transmit the semantic construct of disbelief when he utters the words, The train is due at 8 a.m.
He might also have shrugged his shoulders or used a facial expression that .conveys disbelief. The semantic content is nonetheless the same as if he had also added the words, but I don't believe it.
The speaker thus can make use of phonetic signals that are not intimately associated with the lexical entries in his internal dictionary to convey semantic information that is considered "paralinguistic" by linguists fixed to the segmental framework of a particular language. In the present company, the particular language in question is English which many linguists appear to implicitly take as the "universal" language.
There is no clear dichotomy at the phonetic level. (Gardner and.Gardneru 1969) . Chimpanzees exhibit cognitive and linguistic abilities that are remarkably similar, though more limited, than adult modern Homo sapiens ( Gardner and Gardner, 1969 ;. Premack, 1972) . It is probable that the particular phonetic form of human language is a comparatively recent development in hominid evolution (Lieberman, 1973 "paralinguistic," information. Much of the discussion of the phonetic level of "paralinguistic" communication is based on either inadequate or incorrect phonetic and acoustic analyses. One often encounters, for example, the asser tion that high fundamental frequency conveys some sort of increased "emotionM on the part of the speaker. Psychoacoustic experiments that transposed the fundamental frequency contour of a synthesized utterance from a "normal" to either "high" or "low" pitch ranges failed to show this result (Lieberman and Michaels, 1962) . The same psychoacoustic experiments demonstrated that the expansion, or the compression of the speaker's pitch range also failed to transmit any "emotional" nuances. These results are in accord with recent acoustic and electromyographic investigations that show great variability with respect to these parameterslboth between different speakers and the same speaker, when completely "unemotional" test sentences are spoken (Atkinson, 1973) .
The traditional statements concerning the role of pitch that have, been constantly repeated and reprinted for at least fifty years are wrong. We simply don't know what is happening.
I must stress that-this does not mean that prosodic features do not convey paralinguistic information. The fine structure of fundamental fre quency, that is, the variations in periodicity that occur from one opening and closing cycle of the vocal cords to the next, appear to have a "paralinguistic" function in English (Lieberman, 1961; Lieberman and Michaels, 1962) . Dynamic patterns varying the."normal" prosodic pattern also appear to be relevant.
The segmental features also can convey "paralinguisticwinformation in English.
One of the "paralinguistic" parameters that speakers normally communicate is their intended sex. (This is not'always eqUivalent to biologically determined sex.) It is obvious that prosodic features convey the speaker's intended sex (Brend, 1971 ). The segmental phonetic elements also convey the speaker's intended sex. This is obvious in languages that m;;,:e use of different lexical entries for men and women (Haas, 1964) . It is also true in languages like English where speakers use articulatory maneuvers chat result in formant frequency differences that differentiate the segmental phonetio elements. of men and women (Mattingly, 1966; Schwartz and Rine, 1968; Sachs et al., forthcoming) . In effect, men and women have slightly different dialects that involve acoustically and perceptually different vowels and consonants.
It also appears that these distinctions are the result of acculturation, that they are learned by children as they learn other aspects of their particular dialect (Sachs et al., forthcoming). These distinctions in vowel quality, in languages other than American-English, can be used to differentiate words.
There is, therefore, a "paralinguistic-linguistic" interchange. Note, however, that the "paralinguistic" versus "linguistic" interchange is again really arbitrary. The speaker's sex can, if the culture permits, be signalled either through the use of a different word or different set of syntactic or morphophonemic rules, or through the use of a different set of phonetic features.
The semantic, cognitive information being transferred is the same; only the means change.
We need not limit our data to the communications of humans, or even primates. The bases of cognitive ability and communication can be seen in the behavior of many species. A dog will signal that he wants water by pushing his water bowl. This is.no less an example of cognitive, referential information being communicated than a human requesting a glass of water. We cannot even claim that all of the symbols used by a dog are iconographic. Dogs have been strained" to ring bells when they want water. They could not do this unless they had the ability to associate an abstract symbol, the bell, with water. Human language is the result of a long evolutionary process and it involves factors that aro important in many aspects of human and animal be havior besides communication (Lieberman, 1973 (Goodall, 1971) , therefore, are relevant to the study of the basic parameters that underly human language.
The paralinguistiolinguistic distinction is again arbitrary.
In conclusion, I think that we should be concerned with the general question of how information is transferred. Whether it is labelled paralinguistic or linguistic is of no concern except to those linguists who want to arbitrarily limit the universe of discourse so that they may claim to have found a "universal" linguistic theory that accounts for all aspects of language.
The test of a scientific. theory is not that it accounts for everything, but that it relates a number of phenomena that were seemingly unrelated before the theory was proposed. Newton's Laws of Motion never accounted for frictional phenomena. They nonetheless proved "correct" insofar as they accounted for a 9 diverse range of phenomena that had appeared to be unrelated. To effectively analyze the problem of language, as I have defined language, we have to carefully investigate the acoustic, perceptual, and physiologic parameters that structure language. We have to reexamine many of the premises that are based on either superfioial or inadequate analyses and we cannot arbitrarily limit the data sample. We may not be able to account'for all of the phenomena that we observe, but we will be in a position to assess both the generality and the limitations of our theories. Only then can we progress. 
